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Abstract
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs aim to reduce poverty or achieve other social
goals by making the transfers conditional upon the receivers’ actions. Conditions are
designed to encourage some desirable behavior that recipients might otherwise under-
invest in. An unintended consequence of the conditionality may be to distort recipients’
actions in ways that lower their welfare. The transfer size plays an important role in
shaping such distortionary effects. In certain circumstances, a larger transfer increases
distortion more than that it raises benefits from stronger encouragement, implying
that (i) there is an optimal transfer size for CCTs, and (ii) unconditional cash transfers
(UCTs) may be better than CCTs when the transfer amount is large. We illustrate a
range of distortions arising from CCT programs around the world. We then introduce
an experimental design that permits a test of this distortionary effect, and implement
it in a cash transfer program conditional on seasonal labor migration in rural Indonesia.
We find that when the transfer size exceeds the amount required for travel expenses,
distortion increases and CCT program outcomes deteriorate.
Keywords: Conditional cash transfers, Distortion, Seasonal migration
JEL Codes: I38, O15, J48
∗Correspondence: ahmed.mobarak@yale.edu. Bryan: London School of Economics. Chowdhury: Uni-
versity of Sydney. Mobarak: Yale University and Deakin University. Morten: Stanford University. Smits:
Harvard Kennedy School. We acknowledge funding from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade (DFAT), Evidence Action, and J-PAL Southeast Asia. We thank J-PAL Southeast Asia for their
collaboration in the fieldwork. We also thank Berk Ozler, participants at the 2019 MWIEDC, and seminar
participants at Yale, UC Davis and the University of Sydney, for useful comments. The Yale IRB protocol
number is 2000024824.
1 Introduction
Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs started in the late 1990s in Latin America, and
have become the anti-poverty program of choice in many developing countries around the
world. They have grown from 3 countries in 1997 to 40 countries in 2010, to 64 non-OECD
countries in 2014. Programs have now also been implemented in many OECD countries
(Honorati et al., 2015; Medgyesi and Temesváry, 2013). CCTs are distinct from Uncondi-
tional Cash Transfer (UCT) programs in that they have behavioral conditions tied to them.
Conditionalities attached to most CCT programs aim to encourage human capital invest-
ments. Examples of common conditions include school enrollment and attendance, health
checkup visits of children and their vaccination (Dearden et al., 2009; Macours et al., 2012;
Cahyadi et al., 2020). Other programs encourage positive environmental actions, such as
leaving forest intact or planting new trees (Jayachandran et al., 2017; Jack and Jayachan-
dran, 2019). Under a broader definition, CCTs include scholarships and workfare programs
tied to participation in training or schooling, or supplying labor. Unconditional cash trans-
fers (UCTs) are cheaper to deliver and administer because no monitoring of conditions is
required. This leads to a fundamental tradeoff that policymakers designing transfer programs
must grapple with: Are adding conditions to transfer programs and monitoring adherence
worth it? Do CCTs improve welfare beyond UCTs?
The literature has examined the UCT-CCT tradeoff before (Baird et al., 2011; Attanasio
et al., 2015; Akresh et al., 2013; Bergstrom and Dodds, 2020), but we add a new and impor-
tant dimension to this debate: while CCTs may encourage desirable behaviors, it may also
distort recipients’ decisions into engaging in activities that may not be socially desirable.
For example, the conditioning of cash transfers on adult’s participation in a public works
program may increase children’s domestic work to compensate for their parent’s absence,
thereby reducing their school enrollment (Shah and Steinberg, 2019).
This article begins by illustrating examples of distortionary effects from a wide array of
locations and contexts. Next we explore theoretical issues surrounding the tradeoff between
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the encouraging and distortionary effects of conditional cash transfers. In what situations
would we want to impose a condition or constraint on a transfer, even if the beneficiary is
rational and capable of making the best decisions for themselves? Are there market failures
we are trying to correct with the condition? We analyze the role of the transfer size, which
potentially influences both the encouraging and the distortionary effects of the imposed
condition. We characterize situations in which larger transfers increase distortionary effects
while diminishing benefits from stronger encouragement. Thus, even in contexts where CCTs
are successful in addressing a market failure, distortionary effects can start dominating when
the size of the transfer gets large. As a result, in those settings, UCTs may be preferable to
CCTs when the transfer size is large relative to household income.
Next we introduce an experimental design that can quantify this encouragement-distortion
tradeoff, and implement that design in the context of a seasonal migration encouragement
program in rural West-Timor, Indonesia. In many rain-fed areas of the world, poor house-
holds experience seasonal deprivation during the pre-harvest period, and seasonal migration
to a city for casual labor can alleviate this deprivation (Bryan et al., 2014). We randomly
select some subsistence farming families in one of the poorest regions of Indonesia to receive
either an unconditional transfer, or CCT payments (of varying sizes) that are meant to de-
fray travel costs, conditional on the household agreeing to send an individual to a nearby
city in search of employment. The migration condition of the CCT is designed to correct
a market failure first identified in (Bryan et al., 2014), which is the lack of an insurance
market to insure the risky migration outcome of having made migration expenditures but
not finding a job at the destination. Poor households close to subsistence level may hence
be too risk averse to engage in often-profitable seasonal labor migration, and our subsidy
provides insurance against this downside risk.
We find that the CCT induces migration, and also increases migration season earnings
relative to the UCT benchmark treatment. However, when the size of the transfer is increased
beyond what is needed to cover migration travel expenses, distortionary effects prevail. For
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example, people who do not have the skills to succeed at the destination travel only to collect
the CCT payment. Larger transfers induce negative selection into migration of low-return
types, and program impacts deteriorate.
2 Illustrative examples of distortionary effects of CCTs
The literature on Conditional Cash Transfers reveals several demonstrated instances of the
distortion of economic incentives leading to unintended and sometimes undesirable conse-
quences. Table 1 lists several examples.
2.1 Education conditions
Conditioning the transfer on school enrollment of a specific child within the household can
change intra-household resource allocation. Parents may choose to specialize in the education
of the recipient, displacing the schooling of his or her siblings and reallocating the hours of
child labor. The net effect of the transfer depends on both the expanded household budget
set and these distortionary effects. A CCT program in Cambodia reduced school attendance
among ineligible siblings of some program recipients (Ferreira et al., 2017). A Colombian
CCT requiring school enrollment finds that girls spent more hours unpaid household work if
they were not assigned to the program but their sibling was (Barrera-Osorio et al., 2008).
The tying of school attendance requirements to household’s receipt of cash transfers may
also affect the child’s mental health. An RCT in Malawi that transferred $4/month to
families conditional on their adolescent daughters’ school attendance improved the mental
health of girls who already went to school at baseline (Baird et al., 2013). However, when
transfers are increased to $8 or $10/month, making the girls the breadwinner of the entire
family, their mental health can deteriorate.
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Table 1: Examples of conditionalities in CCT programs and behavioral distortions arising from them.
Program & country Conditionality Distortion References
Conditional Subsidies for School
Attendance pilot in Colombia
Enrollment in tertiary
education
Increase in tertiary enrollment only in short (2 years)
programs in low-quality colleges Barrera-Osorio et al. (2019)
Conditional Subsidies for School
Attendance pilot in Colombia;
CESSP scholarship program in
Cambodia
Enrollment in school
Households enroll boys disproportionately; reduced
enrollment of non-treated siblings (Cambodia and
Colombia), who work more hours (Colombia)
(intra-household substitution effect)
Barrera-Osorio et al. (2008)
(Colombia);






tied to credits earned Students choosing STEM subjects less often






Confinement of women to caregiving roles: increasing
their supply of unpaid domestic labor and reducing
their supply of paid labor
De Brauw et al. (2015)
(Mexico);
El-Enbaby et al. (2019)
(Egypt)
Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net
Program (PSNP);




Children substituting labor for adults who are induced
by CCT to work (more) outside household (enterprise):
Reduced school attendance and increased time spent
on domestic work by younger girls (Ethiopia).
Increased agricultural labor supply by older children
(India)
Hodinott and Gilligan (2010)
Zibagwe et al. (2013) (India)
Islam and Sivasankaran (2015)
Shah and Steinberg (2019)
(Ethiopia)
Seasonal migration CCT in
Indonesia Seasonal migration
Increase in transfer size beyond amount needed for
transport induces additional households to select into
migration, who are less productive at the destination
and have lower (or even negative) returns to migration
[this article]
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A pilot in Bogota, Colombia sought to encourage tertiary education via a CCT. The
program increased tertiary enrollment only in short study programs and in low-quality col-
leges, which suggests that the primary driver of individuals’ study choice was to comply
with the CCT condition to receive the subsidy, rather than the intended benefit of education
itself (Barrera-Osorio et al., 2019). Merit-based scholarship programs impose a performance
condition instead of attendance - a minimum performance level according to a pre-specified
metric. The Helping Outstanding Pupils Educationally (HOPE) scholarship program in the
US is an example of such a performance-condition. Performance conditions may lead to
potentially undesirable distortionary effects if people can game program rules. In the HOPE
program for instance, performance evaluation was based on number of credits obtained, lead-
ing students to reduce their enrollment in Science, Technology and Math (STEM) subjects,
which are perceived to be more difficult (Sjoquist and Winters, 2015; Rumbaugh, 2016).
2.2 Gendered conditions
Cash transfers are sometimes targeted to women to support their empowerment by increasing
resources available to them, or because mothers have a greater propensity to invest in the
human capital of children than fathers (Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995; Quisumbing and
Maluccio, 2003; De Brauw et al., 2014; Armand et al., 2020). However, conditions specific
to mothers may risk reinforcing gender norms that women take on caregiving roles. It can
reduce female labor supply especially when adhering to the conditions is time-consuming.
Indeed, the famous Progresa program in Mexico that targets cash transfers to mothers if
children receive health checkups, led to a reduction in female labor supply (De Brauw et al.,
2015). A CCT program in Egypt also reduced labor supply outside of the household for
female recipients (El-Enbaby et al., 2019). It should be noted that income effects from the
CCT could also cause the reduction in labor supply.1 Or, households may choose to change
1Banerjee et al. (2017) re-analyze data from seven randomized controlled trials of government-run UCT
and CCT programs from six countries to examine impacts on labor supply, and find no significant effect
either individually or pooled on employment or hours of work. Similarly, they find no pooled effect on
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time allocation after investing the transfer in an enterprise. Indeed, the unconditional Human
Development Grant in Ecuador reduced the propensity of transitioning to formal wage labor
(Bosch and Schady, 2019), and a UCT program in Zambia increased labor supply on the own
farm while reducing agricultural wage labor (Ervin et al., 2017; Prifti et al., 2019). Without
the inclusion of a UCT comparison group in an (experimental) evaluation, it is difficult to
assess to what extent empirically observed labor supply responses in a CCT program reflect
distortions due to the conditionality, rather than generic behavioral responses to the cash
component of the program.
2.3 Labor supply conditions
Where transfers are conditioned on an adult member participating in a public works program,
the rationale is often that such public works have a public benefit (e.g., building roads,
clearing debris after a natural disaster, or environmental conservation work). An unintended
consequence can be to increase children’s supply of domestic labor or farm labor, to substitute
for the reduction in parents’ labor. Such distortionary effects on child labor have been
observed in the Productive Safety Net Program (PNSP) in Ethiopia (Hodinott and Gilligan,
2010; Zibagwe et al., 2013) and in India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
(NREGS) (Islam and Sivasankaran, 2015; Shah and Steinberg, 2019). Workfare programs
may also divert mothers’ time from antenatal care, which in the case of NREGS, may have
increased infant mortality (Chari et al., 2019). Given spatial differences in productivity and
employment opportunities, some CCT programs encourage labor migration. Sections 4 and
5 of this article describe a seasonal labor migration CCT we ran and analyzed.
whether work is self-employed/within family vs. outside the household, nor do they find such effects when
disaggregating by gender.
6
2.4 Distortions Induced by Program Qualification Requirements
When potential recipients are aware of program qualification conditions, they may alter eco-
nomic behavior to meet eligibility criteria. For example, the Argentinian CCT programs,
Programa Jefes de Hogar (PJH) and Universal Child Allowance for Social Protection (AUH),
were targeted to the unemployed, and discouraged entry into formal employment (Gasparini
et al., 2009; Garganta and Gasparini, 2015). Likewise, an Uruguayan CCT program reduced
formal employment by 8 percentage points (Bergolo and Cruces, 2018). Brazil’s Bolsa Ali-
mentacao (Feeding Allowance) tied benefits to children being below a particular weight, and
reportedly led to some children being kept underweight in order to qualify (Morris et al.,
2004). If the size of the transfer is determined by the number of children, that can affect
fertility. The Honduran CCT PRAF offered subsidies for health and nutrition to households
with pregnant women or children under age 3, with a payment per child. The program
increased childbearing in the short term (Stecklov et al., 2007). Such behavioral distortions
can accompany either CCTs or UCTs that have program eligibility requirements.
3 Theoretical Considerations
3.1 Encouragement and distortionary effects of CCTs
When markets operate without friction, UCTs will dominate CCTs on efficiency grounds,
since imposing a condition or constraint can only make the beneficiary (weakly) worse off.
However, the rationale for tying conditions to cash transfers is the presence of market failures
that lead individuals to under-invest in certain profitable and/or socially desirable behaviors.
We impose conditions presumably to correct those failures.
Such market imperfections can arise from a variety of sources. First, some of the bene-
fits of the encouraged behavior may be external to the decision-maker. This may lead to
under-investment in behaviors that carry positive externalities (such as investments in the
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human capital of a child), or behaviors that reduce negative externalities (e.g. vaccinations,
deworming, or environmental conservation) (Miguel and Kremer, 2004; Bärnighausen et al.,
2014). Second, individuals may underinvest in behaviors or technologies with positive private
returns due to a lack of information about those returns, or due to psychological biases such
as procrastination, present-bias, or myopic behavior associated with poverty and risk (Car-
valho et al., 2016; Mani et al., 2013; Laajaj, 2017). In some cases, an initial encouragement
(e.g., through a CCT) may enable the decision-maker to learn about the individual-specific
returns to an investment. Examples are an agricultural input whose effect on yield may
depend on the specific soil characteristics of each farmer2 (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995;
Gibbons et al., 2005; Zeitlin, 2011), or migration to a destination with a lack of information
about the odds of finding work or about expected earnings there (Bryan et al., 2014). Beliefs
about returns to investments such as education or migration may also be biased downwards
if people who invested successfully hide or under-report their returns to friends and family,
out of concern of being asked to share their returns with them (Jensen, 2010; Jakiela and
Ozier, 2016; Baseler, 2020).
However, tying of conditions to transfers also distorts relative prices for a recipient. A pro-
gram that transfers resources to mothers conditional on health checkups for their children
reduces the relative cost of healthcare, but to the extent that these checkups are time-
consuming, they may also divert time from earning labor income. Hence, compared to a
UCT, there is a potential efficiency cost to CCTs.
3.2 The role of the transfer size
The size of a cash transfer plays an important role in the magnitude of encouragement and
distortionary effects of CCTs, and therefore in determining the net effects of a CCT program.
Consider the case of a CCT targeting a profitable behavior that individuals underinvest in
due to a market failure, but where the benefits of take-up of the CCT and compliance with the
2Voucher programs that condition a subsidy on the purchase of specific agricultural inputs are common
across Sub-Saharan Africa, see Holden (2019) for a review.
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Figure 1: Individuals underestimate the returns to an investment targeted by a CCT (e.g.,
education, labor migration). A CCT of size S∗ corrects this market failure; increases in the
transfer size beyond S∗ generate distortion.
condition are private to the recipient. Those benefits vary across individuals. For example,
benefits of education or migration can vary with skill sets, or benefits of health checkups
depend on pre-existing conditions. We assume all takers of the CCT comply with the imposed
condition, and cost of compliance also varies (e.g. opportunity cost of school enrollment can
differ across households). Individuals with the highest benefits and lowest cost of compliance
would select into the CCT program. When the size of the transfer is increased, additional
individuals with progressively lower returns and/or higher costs would choose to participate.
As a result, the marginal private benefit is a downward-sloping function of the share of the
population complying with the condition, and the private cost is an upward-sloping function
(Figure 1). Selection into treatment on the basis of individual-specific expected gains is also
referred to as essential heterogeneity (Heckman et al., 2006).
The optimal CCT subsidy size is S∗. As in the case of Pigouvian analysis, the transfer
equals the extent to which people underestimate private returns (or the size of the external-
ity), so as to equalize the true marginal social benefits of investing with the marginal cost of
compliance. Transfer sizes exceeding S∗ generate distortion, with larger transfers creating
greater distortion and reducing the welfare effects of the program. Hence, for large enough
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transfers, UCTs can dominate the welfare effects of a CCT of the same size, even in the
presence of a market failure.
Note that our analysis implicitly assumes that the private benefits and costs to each
individual are independent of the transfer size. Larger transfers worsen the composition of
the pool of compliers, but do not generate additional benefits per complying recipient. In
some situations, larger transfers could enable recipients to make more profitable investments.
For example, a larger scholarship may allow the recipient to attend a better college if those
are more costly, or a larger migration subsidy may allow travel to cities farther away that offer
higher wages. Larger transfers may also allow for more search, enabling a better employment
match.
Larger transfers could also help address the adverse distortionary consequences of CCTs
in some circumstances. For instance, when a CCT for school enrollment of a child of a specific
age or gender displaces a sibling’s education, a large enough CCT may enable it to pay for
the schooling of the un-treated siblings. On the other hand it could intensify the distortion
too. In a workfare program that diverts parents’ time and attention away from children,
larger transfers increase resources available for dowry, which increased child marriage rates
(Tsaneva and O’donoghue, 2019).
In the next section, we apply this conceptual framework to design a CCT for seasonal
migration, and test some implications of essential heterogeneity. Our experimental design
varies the size of CCTs and compares them to a UCT benchmark as a way to quantify the
encouragement-distortion tradeoff embedded in conditionalities.
4 Data and experimental design
4.1 Experimental context
In agrarian areas around the world, labor demand and wages fall during the pre-harvest
season, and the prices of staples tend to rise while the economy waits for the new crop to
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grow. These combine to produce pre-harvest seasonal poverty and hunger (known as the
’lean season’) in many poor rain-fed parts of the world (Bryan et al., 2014; Dercon and
Krishnan, 2000; Jalan and Ravallion, 2001; Khandker and Mahmud, 2012; Macours and
Vakis, 2010; Paxson, 1993; Fink et al., 2020). Rural areas of Eastern Indonesia experience
such seasonal deprivation. In West-Timor the pre-harvest period is known as ‘musim lapar
biasa’ (ordinary hunger period), which sometimes turns into famine-like conditions (known
locally as ’paceklik’) (Basu and Wong, 2015). Some rural households send seasonal migrants
to cities to cope with this seasonal income shortfall. Our experiment is designed to test
whether more households would benefit from employing the migration strategy, but are
currently constrained from doing so. Appendix A provides additional details about the
setting and the experiment, including the cropping calendar in West-Timor and the timing
of our intervention and data collection activities.
4.2 Sampling
Five villages in Timor Tengga Utara (TTU) Regency in West-Timor were sampled based on
poverty incidence and seasonality. Please see Appendix A for details on village selection.
Out of 869 sampled households in these five villages, 855 gave consent to be interviewed
and 775 of them satisfied the eligibility criteria of (i) having at least one household member
aged 21 or above; and (ii) not owning land exceeding 200 Are (2 Hectare). Out of the
baseline sample, 709 households (91%) were re-interviewed at endline, which took place
from December 2017 until February 2018. Sample attrition does not differ statistically
significantly across treatment arms (Appendix Table 4).
4.3 Experimental design
Randomization was done at the household level. First, households were randomized into
either a UCT or a CCT treatment (Table 2). If a UCT-assigned household took up the offer,
it received IDR 150,000 (∼USD 10), and no condition was imposed. Households assigned
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Table 2: Treatment arms (amounts in Rp.)
CCT UCT (D)
High (A) Low (B) Low withsurprise (C)
1st disbursement
at the origin 150,000 75,000 75,000 150,000
2nd disbursement





Total subsidy 300,000 150,000 300,000 150,000
to the CCT arm had the choice to take up the offer and migrate (to a destination of their
choice within West-Timor), or to not take up the offer. The CCT payment was divided into
two installments: Half paid at the village of origin after the offer is accepted, and the other
half collected at the destination city after “checking in” with a program officer. This helped
us monitor adherence to the conditionality.
The CCT arm was further split into three groups with varying transfer amounts, to
understand distortionary effects through differential selection of migrants. A group we label
‘CCT-high’ received IDR 150,000 at the origin, and an additional IDR 150,000 after checking
in at the destination (IDR 300,000 total). People randomized into a ‘CCT-low’ group received
IDR 75,000 at the origin, and they were told they would get an additional IDR 75,000 upon
checking in at the destination. Hence, their total disbursement of 150,000 equalled that
of the UCT group. This CCT-low group was further split into two, whereby half of the
households assigned to CCT-low at baseline who check in at a destination, were ‘surprised’
upon checking in to receive a second subsidy of IDR 225,000 rather than IDR 75,000. We
label this group ‘CCT-low+’. They also received IDR 300,000 in total, like the CCT-high
group.
Doubling the promised transfer from 150,000 to 300,000 changes the selection of house-
holds who migrate, and that is the potential distortion that our research design was meant to
capture. However, the larger transfer may also cause ex-post actions (e.g., searching longer
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for a job due to having a larger buffer, investing in household enterprises), which confounds
the selection effect we are interested in. This is why the ‘surprise’ component in CCT-low+
is useful: The total transfer was 300,000, so it controls for the direct income effect, but since
those households did not know that they were going to receive this when they made their
offer take-up and migration decisions, we are able to capture the pure effect of the selection
or distortion. We do so by comparing the effect of assignment to CCT-high or CCT-low+ on
ex-post outcomes such as migration season household income. The ex-post ‘surprise’ treat-
ment arm was inspired by Karlan and Zinman (2009), who offered different interest rates
before and after loan applications are made to experimentally disentangle adverse selection
from moral hazard in a credit market.
Appendix Table 4 shows that the treatment arms were generally balanced at baseline, but
we show results with and without controlling for baseline covariates. Given that randomiza-
tion was done at the household-level, there is a possibility of spillover effects on UCT assigned
households (for example, by inducing some UCT assigned neighbors to (co-)migrate). The
direction of spillover effects apparent in Appendix Figure 7 shows that the impact on in-
come of the CCT (as compared to the UCT), if anything, is an underestimate of the true
effect. Appendix B also contains a description of the construction of the variables used in
our analysis.
5 Results
5.1 CCT versus UCT
Not surprisingly, the CCT subsidy is more likely to be spent on seasonal migration (to adhere
to the condition), whereas the UCT subsidy is more likely to be spent on non-farm capital
and food consumption (Appendix 4). Recipients of the CCT-low group receive the same
total subsidy amount as UCT recipients. However, despite the significantly lower take-up
rate in the CCT-low group (41.8%) as compared to the UCT group (93.8%), the CCT-low
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group dominates the UCT group in terms of the intent-to-treat effect on migration season
income (columns (7)-(10) in Table 3; Appendix Figure 6). Since the emphasis of this article
is on distortionary effects of CCTs, we now turn to the differences between CCT-high and
CCT-low arms in columns (1)-(6).
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Table 3: Impact (intent-to-treat effects) of assigned treatments on take-up of the offer, checking in at the destination, and
household income during the peak of the migration season (the first two weeks of September).
CCT subsample Full sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent variable: Accepting offer Check-in at adestination
Migration Season






















































high = low+ 0.077* 0.015**
SES < median: high = low/low+ 0.145 0.099* 0.011** 0.016**
SES > median: high = low/low+ 0.875 0.683 0.406 0.434
E(dep. var. | CCT-low) 0.510 0.510 0.423 0.423 133.085 133.085
E(dep. var. | UCT) 0.928 0.928 90.257 90.257
Controls X X X X X
Observations 526 474 526 474 474 474 775 708 708 708
R2 0.002 0.031 0.014 0.036 0.008 0.067 0.163 0.169 0.020 0.080
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors are clustered at the household level. Migration season household income is winsorized
at the 99th percentile to ameliorate the undue influence of outlying observations. Controls include the head of household’s gender and years
of education, whether (s)he speaks Indonesian, household size, and a socio-economic status (SES) index, and village indicators. The F-test
p-values for columns (7)-(10) are based on regressions of the outcomes on the CCT high and CCT-low/low+ assignment indicators where the
sample is split between below-median and above-median SES households, instead of controlling for the interactions of treatment with the SES
index. Details on the outcome variables and the construction of the SES index can be found in Appendix B.
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5.2 Testing for Distortion
Providing the large subsidy raises the likelihood that households accept the CCT offer, and
then significantly raises the rate at which migrants check-in with our program staff at a
destination. CCT-high recipients are 11 percentage points more likely to check-in at the
destination than the ‘CCT-low’/‘low+surprise’ base check-in rate of 42% (columns (3)-(4)
in Table 3).3 No statistically significant differences between the CCT groups are found on
the choice of destination, the duration of the migration, or on the propensity to find work
(Appendix Table 6 and 7). The key question for us is whether this additional migration
induced by the CCT-high treatment is “distortionary” in the sense that it induces a set
of people to migrate for whom this is not really a productive activity. Simple accounting
using our data suggests that this could be a problem, in principle. Migrants report their
transportation expenditures, so we know that the CCT-low subsidy amount suffices for
transport to common migration destinations (Appendix Table 6 and Appendix Figure 5).
In other words, the extra transfer received by CCT-high assigned households exceeds their
transport expenditure requirement, so it could induce recipients to travel just to collect the
money, even if they are not especially well-suited or eager to find work at the destination.
Columns (5) and (6) (Table 3) indicate that this appears to be an issue. Even though
the verified migration (destination check-in) rate is higher among CCT-high recipients, they
report significantly lower migration season income compared to CCT-low+ households. The
CCT-high vs CCT-low+ is the most relevant experimental comparison, because we hold
the ultimate size of the transfer constant in these two groups, and only vary the selection.
Column 6 shows that households that received the CCT-high offer have Rp. 32,000 lower
migration season income (p-value = 0.015) compared to households that received the CCT-
low+ offer. This difference is not driven by outliers (Appendix Figure 6).4 The CCT-low+
3To the recipient household, CCT-low and CCT-low+surprise treatments are indistinguishable from
each other until a household member checks in at a destination, which is why we only have one regressor
(CCT-high) in columns (1)-(4), and the combined ‘low’ transfer is the omitted category
4No effects of any of the treatments was found on household food security during the hungry season
at endline (Appendix Table 8), possibly due to the hungry season not coinciding with (coming after) the
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group ultimately received the same-sized transfer as CCT-high, so we are holding constant
any ‘moral hazard’ on labor supply caused by the monetary transfer, and only focusing on
differences based on who selects in under each treatment.
5.3 Variation across Rich and Poor Households
If the large transfer indeed distorts people’s decisions by inducing them to travel only to
collect the transfer even when migration is not otherwise economically sensible, then we
might expect this to be more of a problem among poorer households who are more desperate
for this transfer. Columns (7)-(10) of Table 3 adds interaction terms between the assigned
treatments and a measure of the household’s socio-economic status (SES) at baseline to
explore this heterogeneity. Higher values of the SES index correspond to higher household
wealth. Please see Appendix B for details on the construction of this index.
Columns (7) and (8) show that naturally, take-up of the offer is highest in the UCT group
(93%). Among the poorest households, take-up is a little higher for the CCT-high compared
to the CCT low/low+ groups. The coefficients on two SES-interaction terms imply that as
households get richer, the take-up difference between CCT-high and CCT-low disappears.
Most importantly, columns (9) and (10) show that it’s only among the poorest households
in our sample that the CCT-high treatment generates significantly smaller migration season
income. In the poorer half of our sample, migration season income is significantly lower
when the large transfer is offered (p-value of difference = 0.011). The coefficients on the
SES interaction terms imply that as we move up the income ladder in our sample, the gap
between the effects of CCT-high vs low on migration income disappears. In the richer half
of the sample, there is no significant gap (p-value = 0.41).
We interpret these results to mean that the relatively large size of the CCT-high transfer
distorts the behavior of low-wealth households more. When offered a large subsidy, some
additional low-wealth households are induced to accept the offer and migrate merely to collect
migration season in West-Timor (as described in Appendix A.
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the subsidy at the destination, even if migration is not an economically sensible activity for
that family. This lowers the overall effectiveness of the program under the CCT-high transfer.
6 Discussion
Policymakers face choices about whether to condition the transfers on socially desirable be-
haviors, about the type of conditions imposed, and about the transfer size. Theoretical
considerations and credible empirical evidence can guide such decisions. A complete welfare
accounting would include effects of the cash component, effects of adherence to the encour-
aged behavior that corrects the targeted market failure, distortionary effects of the imposed
condition, distributional effects (changes in inequality), and spillover effects on treated and
non-treated households. In this article, we focused on the distortionary effects on targeted
households. Reviewing the literature of empirical impact evaluations of CCTs, we identified
distortions brought about by CCT programs across a range of geographies, conditions, and
target populations. Our conceptual framework focused on the role of the transfer size. It
highlights that in certain CCTs, the distortionary effects increase in the transfer size, so
that for large enough transfers, a UCT eventually outperforms a CCT, even when there is
a market failure that the CCT corrects. Applying this framework to a seasonal migration
CCT in Indonesia, we found that for increases in the transfer size beyond what is needed for
recipients to comply with the migration condition, distortion increases and CCT program
outcomes deteriorate.
These findings have several implications for the design of CCT programs and the de-
sign of evaluation studies. First, ex-ante theorizing about possible distortions generated by
conditionality can inform the design of the condition, and nudge us to collect data on distor-
tionary side effects (which may not be directly related to the primary outcomes). Second,
the inclusion of a UCT comparison group allows a comparison of the extent to which ob-
served behavioral responses reflect distortion due to the conditionality, rather than generic
18
behavioral responses to the cash component of the program. Third, by experimenting with
the transfer size, the policy maker can calibrate the amount that maximizes net program
welfare effect given the encouragement-distortion tradeoff highlighted in this paper.
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Appendix A Context of the experiment in West-Timor,
Indonesia
A.1 Village sampling
The RCT was conducted in West-Timor, in Nusa Tengarra Timur (NTT) province, Indone-
sia. West-Timor contains 5 of NTTs districts, plus the city of Kupang (the provincial capital
city). The experiment was conducted in Timor Tenggah Utara (TTU) district, because of its
seasonality and high poverty incidence. TTU district counts 24 sub-districts and 193 villages,
and its capital city is Kefamenanu. We selected 5 villages in 5 different sub-districts, based
on (i) seasonality, (ii) high poverty incidence (based on data from the Indonesian village cen-
sus PODES), (iii) location near the border of the TTU and TTS regencies (and therefore a
similar distance to So’e, Kefamenanu, and other destination cities), and (iv) population of at
least 1000 households per village. Within villages, sub-villages (Rukun Warga’s (RWs)) were
selected randomly, and within these RWs, every household was listed until 185 households
per village were reached. Of the 869 households sampled, 855 consented to be interviewed,
of which 775 met the eligibility criteria.
A.2 Cropping calendar and timing of data collection activities
2 shows the cropping calendar of various crops in West-Timor, Indonesia. Maize and rice
are staples. There are some paddy fields, but most crops are grown on dry fields. Rural
work opportunities are scant from May until November. West-Timor being predominantly of
Christian, most seasonal migrants return to their village of origin at the end of the calendar
year for Christmas. The hungry season runs roughly from December until February, before
the maize harvests that take place around March. Figure 2 also shows the timing of the
intervention and data collection: baseline data collection, treatment (subsidy) offers, migrant
tracking, and endline survey.
Figure 2: The agricultural cycle in West-Timor and the timing of the baseline and endline
surveys.
1
A.3 Timing of migration
Figure 3 shows that September is the month in which most (as in: more than any other
month) of the households have a household member who has migrated and is at a destination.
We therefore use household income in the first two weeks of September as out measure of
migration season household income.
Figure 3: The distribution of the calendar month in which the migration reportedly started.
2
Appendix B Variable construction
B.1 Migration measures
The binary measure of migration is whether a migrant has checked in at a destination with
a program officer. Besides this measure of the extensive margin of migration, there are two
measures of the intensive margin of migration: a households’ number of migrations since
the baseline survey, and the number of different individuals within a household who (have)
migrated. Due to time constraints, we only measured up to a maximum of 2 migration
episodes: the (time-wise) first migration since mid-July, and the ‘last’ migration until the
endline survey. Of course, migrations were included regardless of whether the migrant had
returned by the time the endline survey arrived. Only 16 households had two migrations,
of which 7 households had the same individual making more than one trip. Due to this
low number of households with more than 1 migration - and the even lower numbers by
treatment arm, we do not report experimental results on those outcomes.
B.2 Other outcomes measures: household income and food security
index
The income streams over this period, both cash and in-kind, are aggregated over the three
biggest income earners in the household. We also have this variable recorded for the week
prior to the households’ interview at endline, which took place between November 2017 and
January 2018. For each income source, the respondent(s) were asked whether this income was
earned at the origin or at the destination. Hence, by adding up only those income flows that
accrued at the origin, we have a proxy for household income earned at the origin; likewise,
we have a proxy for household income earned at the destination by adding up income flows
earned at the destination. To ameliorate the unduly influence of outliers, we winsorize all
these outcome at the 99th percentile. Apart from household income, the endline survey also
asked migrants (or informants about them), to give an estimate of their entire income (cash
and in-kind) over the span of their migration. To attempt to get a measure of earnings,
this number could be divided by the duration of the migration. Respondents were asked at
endline about the start and end date of the migrations episodes. However, for 121 out of 239
households with a seasonal migrant (51%), the respondent could not recall the start date,
and so the migration duration cannot be calculated more precisely than in months.
The food security index is constructed using empirical weights on the following ques-
tions/variables elicited at endline:
• Compared to the normal portions and normal frequency of HH members who are
17 years old and above normally eat, how many days [0,7] in the last 7 days did
those HH members limit meal portion size due to lack of food? (First respondent is
asked the corresponding binary question. We imputed 0 here if answered ‘No’ to the
corresponding binary question.) This number of days is divided by the number of HH
members aged 17 and above.
• Compared to the normal portions and normal frequency of HH members who are 17
years old and above normally eat, how many days [0,7] in the last 7 days did those HH
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members have to skip meal because there was not enough food? (First respondent is
asked the corresponding binary question. We imputed 0 here if answered ‘No’ to the
corresponding binary question.) This number of days is divided by the number of HH
members aged 17 and above.
• In the last 7 days, how many HH members who are 17 years old and above in your
household did eat rice?
• In the last 7 days, how many HH members who are 17 years old and below in your
household did eat rice?
• How much was total quantity of rice your HH consumed during the last 7 days? Enu-
merator convert the measurement unit in kilogram
• Did members of your HH consume maize in the last 7 days?
• Did members of your HH consume cassava in the last 7 days?
• In the last 7 days, did your household eat meat or fish?
• In the last 7 days, how many HH members who are 17 years old and above in your
household did eat eggs?
• In the last 7 days, how many HH members who are 17 years old and below in your
household did eat eggs?
B.3 Control variables
In Table 3 in the main text, as well as in the experimental results in Tables 5-8, we report
intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates both with and without the inclusion of control variables in
those regressions. The set of controls: the (i) gender and (ii) years of education completed
by the household head, (iii) household size, (iv) a PCA-based SES index, (v) whether the
interview was administered in Indonesian or in another (local) language, and (vi) a set of
indicator variables for all but one of the five sample villages. The indicators making up
the SES index include: whether there is a wage earner in the household, land size, housing
condition, whether the household was able to save any maize seeds for the planting season,
and the numbers of pigs, cows, goats and horses owned by the household.
4
Appendix C Descriptive results
C.1 Descriptive statistics and balance check
Table 4 reports summary statistics for post-treatment outcomes and balance tests for co-
variates. The randomization, which was done at the household level, was not stratified on
covariates. It appears important to control for household size and baseline socio-economic
status (SES) in our intent-to-treat (ITT) estimations, given that the means of those variables
are marginally statistically significantly different across treatment arms.
C.2 Reported main usage of the subsidy
Figure 4 shows that the CCT treatments led households in these treatment groups to be
substantially more likely to spend the plurality of their subsidy on transportation and ac-
commodation for seasonal migration.
A possibility is that the larger subsidy of the CCT high arm enable lumpy investment oppor-
tunities (other than migration) in the origin with a long gestation period, which do not show
up (to the same extent as seasonal migration investments) in migration season income. Such
lumpy investments (education, fixed capital business investments such as livestock) may help
poor households escape poverty traps where those exist (Carter and Barrett, 2006; Giesbert
and Schindler, 2012; Balboni et al., 2019; Banerjee et al., 2019). While we cannot rule out
this possibility, there do not seem to be substantial differences across the three CCT arms
in terms of households’ reported primary usage of the subsidy (Figure 4).
Figure 4: Main use of the subsidy by treatment arm (subsample who accepted the treatment
offer).
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C.3 Reported migration travel expenditure across treatment arms
Figure 5 plots the empirical CDF of travel expenditure of the migrants in each of the treat-
ment arms. It does not reveal systematic differences between the CCT arms in terms of
travel expenditure to the destinations.
Figure 5: The empirical cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of migrant travel expen-
ditures across treatment arms.
6
Table 4: Summary statistics and randomization checks.


























































































































1 For categorical variables, the p-value of the equality across treatment arms is based on a χ2 test; for
continuous variables, it is based on ANOVA. The ‘checking in’ outcome only applies to the CCT arms.
2 Measured at endline.
3 Household size, educational attainment of the household head, and the indicator for the household head
speaking Indonesian, were recorded at endline.
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Appendix D Experimental results
D.1 Treatment offer acceptance
Table 5 reports the acceptance rates of the cash transfer offers across the treatment arms.
As expected, most households accept the UCT offer5. The difference in acceptance rates
among the three CCT arms does not attain statistical significance.
Table 5: Regressions of accepting the treatment offer on the
treatment arms (linear probability models).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CCT high -0.368*** -0.342*** -0.368*** -0.342***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
CCT low -0.418*** -0.390***
(0.043) (0.045)
CCT low+ -0.419*** -0.413***
(0.042) (0.044)
CCT low/low+ -0.418*** -0.403***
(0.032) (0.034)
Test high=low=low+ 0.534 0.318
Test high=low & low+ 0.262 0.186
Constant 0.938*** 0.893*** 0.928*** 0.893***
(0.016) (0.057) (0.016) (0.057)
Controls X X
N 775 708 775 708
R2 0.156 0.183 0.156 0.183
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; robust standard errors clustered
at the household level in parentheses. UCT is the left-out cate-
gory/arm. Controls include the head of household’s gender and
years of education, whether (s)he speaks Indonesian, household
size, and a socio-economic status (SES) index, and village indi-
cators. Details on the outcome variables and the construction of
the SES index can be found in Appendix B.
D.2 Differences between the CCT arms in migration aspects
To explore differences in behavior brought about by the high CCT (as compared to the CCT
low/low+), we conduct additional exploratory analyses of differences between the treatment
arms in terms of aspects of the migration (6). Due to the low absolute number of migrants per
treatment arm, few of the coefficients are statistically significant and the difference between
the three CCT arms is not statistically significant for any of the estimates. We are unable to
5Based on anecdoctical evidence, the reason 7% of UCT-assigned households do not take up the cash
transfer offer is distrust, given prior experience with shams.
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determine with statistical confidence whether the CCT high opted to migrate earlier (column
(1)) or for a longer duration (column (2)), be more likely to migrate to a city (closer to the
check-in where to receive the second subsidy) (column (6) or within the district (column
(5)), rather than somewhere else where returns may be higher, whether they are more likely,
for instance, to send the household head to seasonally out-migrate as opposed to another
household member (column (7)), or whether they have a household member who migrated
in the past (column (8)).
Table 6: ITT estimates on aspects of migration for the subsample of migrants.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Migration Migration Transport Total migr. Dest: Dest: Head Previously
start month duration cost cost TTU Urban migrated migrated
CCT low -0.026 -0.057 -0.886 -1.959 -0.053 0.070 -0.171* -0.046
(0.083) (0.159) (0.701) (1.391) (0.110) (0.093) (0.087) (0.125)
CCT low+ -0.061 0.053 -1.241* -2.279* 0.119 -0.009 -0.103 0.024
(0.083) (0.148) (0.652) (1.289) (0.104) (0.095) (0.076) (0.114)
CCT high -0.095 -0.068 -0.335 -1.730 0.083 0.050 -0.179** 0.010
(0.082) (0.136) (0.765) (1.360) (0.101) (0.092) (0.075) (0.113)
Test (p-value) 0.519 0.514 0.384 0.592 0.163 0.582 0.538 0.775
E[dep. var. | UCT] 2.950 2.309 4.178 3.974 0.510 0.749 0.732 0.663
(st. dev.) (1.101) (1.588) (3.481) (4.549) (0.501) (0.435) (0.444) (0.474)
N 238 223 190 239 239 239 239 190
(Pseudo-)R2 0.005 0.036 0.089 0.264 0.060 0.052 0.106 0.065
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; robust standard errors clustered at the household level in
parentheses. The outcome of column (1) takes on 0 if the migration reportedly started in May
2017, 1 if it reportedly started in June 2017, etcetera, and 7 if it reportedly started in December
2017. The outcome of column (2) is the duration of the seasonal migration in months, which
is censored at the endline interview month for households whose migrant had not returned by
the time of their endline interview. Column (3) (migration transport expenditures) and column
(4) (total migration expenditure including housing) are in 10,000 IDR. The sample consists of
households in TTU regency, so the outcome in column (5) takes on 1 if the migration destination
is within the same regency (and 0 otherwise). Column (6) takes on 1 if the migration is to an
urban destination, column (7) takes on 1 if it was the household head (rather than another
household member) who migrated, and column (8) takes on 1 if at least one household member
had ever migrated before the baseline survey. Estimates of columns (1) and (2) are based on
Poisson regressions; those of column (3)-(8) are based on OLS regressions. UCT is the left-out
category/arm. Controls include the head of household’s gender and years of education, whether
(s)he speaks Indonesian, household size, and a socio-economic status (SES) index (details can
be found in Appendix B), and village indicators.
D.3 Intent-to-treat effects on employment status
.
Table 7 shows estimates on work (any work, including self-employment) and salaried
work during the peak of the migration season (the first two weeks of September). The CCT
9
raises the propensity to have work in September compared to the UCT, but there are no
statistically significant differences between the three CCT arms.
Table 7: ITT estimates on work and salaried work (i.e., working for
others) during peak migration season (linear probability models).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Work (any) Work (any) Salaried work Salaried work
CCT high 0.072** 0.068** 0.099** 0.095**
(0.028) (0.015) (0.040) (0.034)
CCT low 0.024 0.027 0.081* 0.071*
(0.035) (0.027) (0.044) (0.027)
CCT low+ 0.034 0.037 0.077* 0.059
(0.033) (0.028) (0.042) (0.035)
Test (p-value) 0.225 0.084 0.888 0.574
E(dep.var. | UCT) 0.868 0.868 0.158 0.158
(0.340) (0.340) (0.366) (0.366)
Controls X X
N 708 708 708 708
R2 0.008 0.023 0.010 0.041
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; robust standard errors clustered at the house-
hold level in parentheses. UCT is the left-out category/arm. Controls include
the head of household’s gender and years of education, whether (s)he speaks In-
donesian, household size, and a socio-economic status (SES) index, and village
indicators. Details on the outcome variables and the construction of the SES
index can be found in Appendix B.
D.4 Intent-to-treat effects on food security
.
Table 8 shows ITT estimates on the food security index.
D.5 Empirical CDFs of migration season household income
.
Figure 6 shows the empirical CDFs of migration season household income (in IDR 10,000)
across treatment arms.
D.6 Spillover effects
Since randomization into treatments was done at the household level, it is possible that
information about seasonal jobs spilled over from CCT-assigned households to some UCT-
assigned households who reside in the same village, or that UCT-assigned households are
induced by CCT-assigned households in their village to co-migrate with them. As a thought
experiment, intra-village CCT-to-UCT spillovers - regardless of the mechanism through
which they operate, would be zero for UCT-assigned households if no households in the
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Table 8: ITT estimates on the food security in-
dex at endline.
(1) (2)
CCT high -0.114 -0.096
(0.097) (0.083)
CCT low -0.028 -0.059
(0.111) (0.162)
CCT low+ -0.013 0.012
(0.107) (0.086)






* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; robust standard
errors clustered at the household level in parenthe-
ses. UCT is the left-out category/arm. Controls in-
clude the head of household’s gender and years of
education, whether (s)he speaks Indonesian, house-
hold size, and a socio-economic status (SES) index,
and village indicators. Details on the outcome vari-
ables and the construction of the SES index can be
found in Appendix B.
village would receive the CCT treatment (as would be the case with village-level random-
ization). Hence, we assess heterogeneity in the ITT on household income by the number
of other households in the village that received a CCT treatment (which has some random
variation). While not statistically significant, Figure 7 shows suggestive evidence of mod-
est spillover effects.6 Since the impact on migration season income of the CCT compares
favorable to that of the UCT, the negative slope of the conditional ITT in Figure 7 implies
that the ITT estimates on migration season income of CCT (compared to UCT) reported in
Table 3 in the main text, if anything, are lower bounds on the corresponding true effects.
6The doubly robust conditional average treatment effect estimator by Lee et al. (2017) was used.
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Figure 6: The empirical cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of household income (in
IDR 10,000) by assigned treatment. Note: the plot region was limited to Rp. 11,180,000;
only one observation (in the CCT low group) of Rp. 19,560,000 exceeds that value.
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Figure 7: Household income by assigned treatment. CITT stands for Conditional Intent-to-
treat effect.
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